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zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification

ZIP MCP server: create, inspect, verify, extract securely, modify without recompression. 13 tools

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About zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification

zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification is an MCP server published by Nizoka in the Files category: zIP MCP server: create, inspect, verify, extract securely, modify without recompression. 13 tools.

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Install

Claude Code
claude mcp add zipnative-mcp-zip-creation-inspection-secure-extraction-verification -- npx -y zipnative-mcp
npx
npx -y zipnative-mcp

This server has no ConduID identity, so agent calls to it are not receipted. Pin the version you install and review the source before granting it credentials.

Tools (13)

compute_crc32The ZIP checksum (IEEE 802.3 CRC-32, the engine's slice-by-8) of text, base64 or a sandbox file streamed in 1 MiB chunks; `seed` chains chunks, `expect` compares.

Parameters not published.

create_zipWrite a ZIP from inline text / base64 / sandbox files (up to 100 000 entries — Zip64 auto-promotes past 65 535). **Reproducible on one runtime by default** (canonical order, DOS-epoch timestamps, UTF-8 names); `compression.deterministic: true` for identical bytes on every runtime — `summary.deterministic` is `true` ONLY then (a default call reports `false` with `deflateTier: 'node-zlib'`); store / deflate at archive or entry level; `order: 'insertion'` for EPUB / JAR; comments, Unix modes, extra fields; streamed sources; the worker pool (`parallel`, byte-identical); `includeSha256` proofs in base64 and file mode.

Parameters not published.

describe_engineOffline preflight: versions, deflate tiers, runtime codecs and workers, the engine's default limits, the operator ceilings, every server cap, sandbox / cache state, the 39 error codes and 11 diagnostic codes, the deliberately unexposed engine exports. `network` is always `'none'`.

Parameters not published.

draft_governance_issueDraft a governance-compliant GitHub issue **locally** for a **human** to review and submit — never submits, no network, no GitHub write path.

Parameters not published.

extract_zip**Secure by default**: zip-slip / device names, symlinks, duplicate paths, declared-size and ratio bombs, overlapping entries and central/local divergence refused with frozen `ZIP_*` codes; relaxations are explicit named inputs that skip, never emit. Inline files (`includeData: false` = dry run — it opens eagerly and refuses an overlapping, offset-into-CD or Zip64-spoofed archive before returning any plan) or streamed into the sandbox with resource links.

Parameters not published.

inflate_rawRaw DEFLATE (RFC 1951) through the engine's resumable inflater with a **mandatory `maxOutput`** bound: exact `bytesConsumed`, trailing bytes as `leftover`. Feed it `read_zip_entry mode: 'raw'`.

Parameters not published.

inspect_zipONE-call archive report: sizes, entry / file / directory counts, Zip64, comment, compressed vs uncompressed totals, per-method counts, encrypted / symlink / data-descriptor / Zip64 / cp437 / duplicate / unsafe-name counts, date range, a **determinism verdict** (the structural one: epoch timestamps + canonical order + UTF-8 flags) and every engine diagnostic. Opens eagerly: every entry's real extent is checked up front — overlapping entries, entries reaching into the central directory or past EOF, Zip64 spoofing — and refused with their `ZIP_*` code (a method / CRC / size divergence between central and local headers is caught by `verify_zip` and on read, not here). `check: […]` + `assert: {…}` turn it into a **CI gate**.

Parameters not published.

list_zip_entriesPaged central-directory inventory, nothing decompressed — every entry as a full row (sizes, CRC-32, method, timestamp, flags, Unix mode, symlink, Zip64, offsets, extra fields, the sanitized path an extraction would use, raw name bytes). `filter` by names / prefix / glob, `offset` + `limit` (200 default, 2000 max).

Parameters not published.

modify_zipadd / replace / remove / rename / setComment **without recompressing anything**. `mode: 'append'` keeps the original bytes verbatim (removed content stays recoverable — data remanence, said loudly); `mode: 'compact'` rewrites canonically so it is truly gone.

Parameters not published.

read_zip_entryONE entry by `name` or `index` without extracting: decompressed content as base64 or UTF-8 text (CRC-verified), a byte `range` through the chunked stream, the raw compressed payload (`mode: 'raw'`), or a non-throwing integrity check (`mode: 'verify'`).

Parameters not published.

Show all 13 tools
sanitize_entry_pathsThe engine's single traversal gate over a list of names: the safe `/`-relative form each maps to, or `null` with the rule that fired (traversal, absolute, drive, UNC, NUL, ADS, device name). No archive needed.

Parameters not published.

scan_zip_forwardWalk local headers in stream order with bounded memory — the only tool that works on a **truncated download or a cut / unseekable stream that starts at a local header**, and the only one whose result is NOT authoritative (`trust: 'local-headers-only'`). `tolerateTruncation: true` returns the partial inventory plus the error. It cannot skip an SFX / prepended prefix and refuses one (`ZIP_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH`): `inspect_zip` reports it (`prependedData`, `ZIP_PREPENDED_DATA`) and `modify_zip mode: 'compact'` drops it.

Parameters not published.

verify_zipDeep verification in one call — the engine's `verifyZip` report verbatim: structure, every entry's CRC-32 / size / local-header agreement, encrypted entries honestly `skipped` — while an entry whose method has no codec here (anything but 0 store / 8 deflate) is reported **failed**, not skipped. **Never `isError` for an archive problem**: branch on `ok` and `error.code`.

Parameters not published.

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Releases

v1.0.0v1.0.0 — first stable release · 7 Sep 2026zipnative-mcp v1.0.0 — First stable release _Released 2026-09-07_ Built on: zipnative v1.0.0 The first stable release — and the first npm publication — of the Model Context…
Questions

About zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification

How do I install zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification?

Run claude mcp add zipnative-mcp-zip-creation-inspection-secure-extraction-verification -- npx -y zipnative-mcp, then add the server to your MCP client's configuration.

Is zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification safe to use with an AI agent?

Its trust score is 37 out of 100 (low). Conduid hasn't run static security checks on this repository yet, so review the source yourself before granting it credentials. It has no ConduID identity yet, so agent calls to it are not receipted.

Is zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification still maintained?

Yes — the latest release is v1.0.0 (7 Sep 2026), and the last commit was a month ago. The repository has 0 stars.