About zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification
zipnative MCP — ZIP creation, inspection, secure extraction & verification is an MCP server published by Nizoka in the Files category: zIP MCP server: create, inspect, verify, extract securely, modify without recompression. 13 tools.
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Install
claude mcp add zipnative-mcp-zip-creation-inspection-secure-extraction-verification -- npx -y zipnative-mcpnpx -y zipnative-mcpThis server has no ConduID identity, so agent calls to it are not receipted. Pin the version you install and review the source before granting it credentials.
Tools (13)
compute_crc32The ZIP checksum (IEEE 802.3 CRC-32, the engine's slice-by-8) of text, base64 or a sandbox file streamed in 1 MiB chunks; `seed` chains chunks, `expect` compares.
Parameters not published.
create_zipWrite a ZIP from inline text / base64 / sandbox files (up to 100 000 entries — Zip64 auto-promotes past 65 535). **Reproducible on one runtime by default** (canonical order, DOS-epoch timestamps, UTF-8 names); `compression.deterministic: true` for identical bytes on every runtime — `summary.deterministic` is `true` ONLY then (a default call reports `false` with `deflateTier: 'node-zlib'`); store / deflate at archive or entry level; `order: 'insertion'` for EPUB / JAR; comments, Unix modes, extra fields; streamed sources; the worker pool (`parallel`, byte-identical); `includeSha256` proofs in base64 and file mode.
Parameters not published.
describe_engineOffline preflight: versions, deflate tiers, runtime codecs and workers, the engine's default limits, the operator ceilings, every server cap, sandbox / cache state, the 39 error codes and 11 diagnostic codes, the deliberately unexposed engine exports. `network` is always `'none'`.
Parameters not published.
draft_governance_issueDraft a governance-compliant GitHub issue **locally** for a **human** to review and submit — never submits, no network, no GitHub write path.
Parameters not published.
extract_zip**Secure by default**: zip-slip / device names, symlinks, duplicate paths, declared-size and ratio bombs, overlapping entries and central/local divergence refused with frozen `ZIP_*` codes; relaxations are explicit named inputs that skip, never emit. Inline files (`includeData: false` = dry run — it opens eagerly and refuses an overlapping, offset-into-CD or Zip64-spoofed archive before returning any plan) or streamed into the sandbox with resource links.
Parameters not published.
inflate_rawRaw DEFLATE (RFC 1951) through the engine's resumable inflater with a **mandatory `maxOutput`** bound: exact `bytesConsumed`, trailing bytes as `leftover`. Feed it `read_zip_entry mode: 'raw'`.
Parameters not published.
inspect_zipONE-call archive report: sizes, entry / file / directory counts, Zip64, comment, compressed vs uncompressed totals, per-method counts, encrypted / symlink / data-descriptor / Zip64 / cp437 / duplicate / unsafe-name counts, date range, a **determinism verdict** (the structural one: epoch timestamps + canonical order + UTF-8 flags) and every engine diagnostic. Opens eagerly: every entry's real extent is checked up front — overlapping entries, entries reaching into the central directory or past EOF, Zip64 spoofing — and refused with their `ZIP_*` code (a method / CRC / size divergence between central and local headers is caught by `verify_zip` and on read, not here). `check: […]` + `assert: {…}` turn it into a **CI gate**.
Parameters not published.
list_zip_entriesPaged central-directory inventory, nothing decompressed — every entry as a full row (sizes, CRC-32, method, timestamp, flags, Unix mode, symlink, Zip64, offsets, extra fields, the sanitized path an extraction would use, raw name bytes). `filter` by names / prefix / glob, `offset` + `limit` (200 default, 2000 max).
Parameters not published.
modify_zipadd / replace / remove / rename / setComment **without recompressing anything**. `mode: 'append'` keeps the original bytes verbatim (removed content stays recoverable — data remanence, said loudly); `mode: 'compact'` rewrites canonically so it is truly gone.
Parameters not published.
read_zip_entryONE entry by `name` or `index` without extracting: decompressed content as base64 or UTF-8 text (CRC-verified), a byte `range` through the chunked stream, the raw compressed payload (`mode: 'raw'`), or a non-throwing integrity check (`mode: 'verify'`).
Parameters not published.
Show all 13 tools
sanitize_entry_pathsThe engine's single traversal gate over a list of names: the safe `/`-relative form each maps to, or `null` with the rule that fired (traversal, absolute, drive, UNC, NUL, ADS, device name). No archive needed.
Parameters not published.
scan_zip_forwardWalk local headers in stream order with bounded memory — the only tool that works on a **truncated download or a cut / unseekable stream that starts at a local header**, and the only one whose result is NOT authoritative (`trust: 'local-headers-only'`). `tolerateTruncation: true` returns the partial inventory plus the error. It cannot skip an SFX / prepended prefix and refuses one (`ZIP_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH`): `inspect_zip` reports it (`prependedData`, `ZIP_PREPENDED_DATA`) and `modify_zip mode: 'compact'` drops it.
Parameters not published.
verify_zipDeep verification in one call — the engine's `verifyZip` report verbatim: structure, every entry's CRC-32 / size / local-header agreement, encrypted entries honestly `skipped` — while an entry whose method has no codec here (anything but 0 store / 8 deflate) is reported **failed**, not skipped. **Never `isError` for an archive problem**: branch on `ok` and `error.code`.
Parameters not published.
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