Stop pasting tokens into every new Claude session. Store them once, reference them everywhere — including commit-safe .env files.

---

Quick install (one line)

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/vaultry/claude-secrets/main/install.sh | bash

Or via npm:

npm install -g @vaultry/claude-secrets
claude-secrets-setup
claude mcp add claude-secrets --scope user -- claude-secrets-mcp

---

Three interfaces

Interface	Who uses it	Policy-gated
MCP server	Claude Code sessions	Yes (per-project allowlist)
CLI claude-secrets	Your shell, apps, scripts	No (user has Keychain access)
.env placeholders	Any tool that reads .env	Via CLI

---

Store secrets

Pipe from stdin (keeps the value out of shell history):

echo "ghp_xxxxx" | claude-secrets set GITHUB_TOKEN
op read "op://Private/Gitea/token" | claude-secrets set GITEA_TOKEN
claude-secrets set DB_PASSWORD              # interactive — type, Ctrl-D

Encrypted with AES-256-GCM, master key stored in macOS Keychain (syncs between Macs via iCloud Keychain).

---

Commit-safe .env files

Replace real values with secret://NAME references. The .env file can now be committed to git safely — it contains only names, no credentials.

# .env
API_KEY=secret://GITHUB_TOKEN
DB_URL=postgres://app:secret://DB_PASSWORD@db.local/app
PORT=3000

Placeholder syntax: secret://NAME — URI-style, avoids bash parameter-expansion collisions. Names can contain A-Z, 0-9, _, ., -.

---

Expand placeholders

Resolve placeholders to real values at runtime:

eval "$(claude-secrets export)"                    # into current shell
claude-secrets export --format json > resolved.json
claude-secrets export --format dotenv > .env.resolved

claude-secrets export --file .env.staging         # different file
claude-secrets export --on-missing empty          # empty for missing refs

--on-missing	Behavior
throw (default)	Exit 1 with list of missing names
empty	Placeholder becomes empty string
keep	Placeholder left literal (secret://NAME)

---

Run a command with secrets

claude-secrets exec -- pnpm dev                    # inject then run
claude-secrets exec -- node build.js
claude-secrets exec --file .env.prod -- npm run deploy

Secrets live only in the child process — not in the parent shell's environment, history, or ps output.

package.json scripts work seamlessly:

{
  "scripts": {
    "dev": "claude-secrets exec -- ts-node src/index.ts",
    "test": "claude-secrets exec --file .env.test -- vitest",
    "deploy": "claude-secrets exec --file .env.prod -- node deploy.js"
  }
}

---

MCP server (for Claude Code)

After registering with claude mcp add, Claude Code gets 6 tools under mcp__claude-secrets__*:

Tool	Policy check	Effect
set_secret	yes	Store/overwrite (requires allowlist)
get_secret	yes	Return value or Denied
delete_secret	yes	Remove or Denied
list_secrets	filter	{total, visible, names}
search_secrets	filter	Array of matches (regex, case-insensitive)
input_secret	yes	Native macOS dialog prompts user for value → stored directly. Value never passes through the model or chat.

input_secret — secure user input

Use case: Claude needs a token the user hasn't stored yet. Instead of asking "please paste your token in chat" (which leaks the value into transcripts, API logs, and plan files), Claude calls input_secret — a native macOS dialog pops up, user types the value, value goes straight from dialog to encrypted store without Claude ever seeing it.

Claude: "I need a GITEA_TOKEN to push that branch. May I prompt you?"
User: "yes"
Claude: [calls input_secret with name=GITEA_TOKEN]
→ macOS dialog appears on your screen (hidden input)
→ you type the token, press OK
→ value stored in encrypted vault
→ Claude gets back "OK: 'GITEA_TOKEN' stored"

The value never appears in chat, transcripts, or API traffic.

list and search only return names that pass the allowlist. total shows the real count — Claude knows more secrets exist but can't see their names from a non-authorized project.

Per-project allowlist — .claude/secrets.yml

Without this file: all MCP reads and writes blocked — prevents Claude in project A from reading or overwriting secrets from project B.

allow:
  - GITEA_TOKEN
  - GITHUB_*            # glob patterns supported
  - OP_SERVICE_*

Special values:

allow: "*"              # allow everything (not recommended)

allow:
  - GITEA_TOKEN
inject_values: true     # SessionStart hook injects values (opt-in)

secrets.yml is safe to commit — it contains names only.

SessionStart Hook (optional)

Inject available secret names into Claude's context at session start so Claude knows what's available without asking. Add to ~/.claude/settings.json:

{
  "hooks": {
    "SessionStart": [
      {
        "hooks": [
          {
            "type": "command",
            "command": "claude-secrets-session-hook"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

With inject_values: true in secrets.yml, the hook also injects values — they appear in transcripts, history.jsonl, plan files, and API logs. Only use for short-lived tokens in trusted projects. The hook emits a visible warning when values are injected.

---

Slash commands for Claude Code

Two slash commands included in the package:

Command	Effect
/secret-set <NAME>	Native macOS dialog (hidden input) → stored via CLI
/secret-get <NAME>	CLI fetch → copied to clipboard (value never in chat)

Link them into Claude Code's commands directory:

ln -sf $(npm root -g)/@vaultry/claude-secrets/commands/secret-set.md ~/.claude/commands/secret-set.md
ln -sf $(npm root -g)/@vaultry/claude-secrets/commands/secret-get.md ~/.claude/commands/secret-get.md

(The one-line installer handles this automatically.)

---

Security model

Protects against

• Master key outside the encrypted file — held in Keychain, user-locked
• Per-project allowlist blocks cross-project leakage through Claude
• AES-256-GCM — authenticated encryption, tamper detection
• File mode 0600 — owner-only
• Atomic writes (write-to-temp + rename) — no partial-state corruption on crash
• .env with refs — commit-safe by construction
• exec -- injection — secrets stay out of shell history and ps output

Know the trade-offs

• inject_values: true puts values in Claude's system prompt → they appear in transcripts, history.jsonl, plan files, and API logs
• CLI bypasses policy — anyone with your user ID and an unlocked Mac can read all secrets (correct: Keychain is what protects you as a user, policy protects Claude from itself)
• Keychain ACL — after the first "Always Allow", node can read the key without a prompt
• MCP writes are gated by allowlist since v0.1 — prevents cross-project overwrites

Not a defense against

• Malicious local processes running as your user
• Physical access to an unlocked Mac
• A compromised Keychain (root-level malware)

---

CLI reference

claude-secrets help

  get <name>                         Print secret to stdout
  set <name> [value]                 Store secret (value from stdin if omitted)
  delete|rm <name>                   Delete a secret
  list|ls                            List all secret names
  search <pattern>                   Regex search (case-insensitive)

  export [--file .env]               Print 'export KEY=VAL' lines for shell eval
    [--format shell|dotenv|json]     Default: shell
    [--on-missing throw|empty|keep]  Default: throw

  exec [--file .env] -- <cmd...>     Run cmd with expanded env from .env
    [--on-missing throw|empty|keep]  Default: throw

---

Architecture

~/.claude/
└── secrets.encrypted                # AES-256-GCM, mode 0600

@vaultry/claude-secrets (installed)
├── dist/
│   ├── index.js                     # MCP server (stdio)
│   ├── crypto.js                    # AES-256-GCM + Keychain I/O
│   ├── store.js                     # atomic read/write secrets.encrypted
│   ├── policy.js                    # isAllowed() via secrets.yml
│   ├── dotenv.js                    # .env parser + placeholder expansion
│   └── bin/
│       ├── setup.js                 # init CLI
│       ├── session-hook.js          # SessionStart hook
│       └── cli.js                   # claude-secrets CLI
└── commands/                        # Claude Code slash commands

Encryption details

• Algorithm: AES-256-GCM (authenticated encryption, tamper detection)
• IV: 12 bytes, random per write
• Key: 32 bytes, in macOS Keychain as service claude-secrets-mcp, account master-key
• File format: {iv_b64}:{authtag_b64}:{ciphertext_b64}
• Decrypted payload: JSON {name: value}
• Writes: temp-file + rename, atomic on POSIX

Sync between Macs

• iCloud Keychain auto-syncs the master key
• Sync secrets.encrypted via Dropbox/iCloud Drive/git-crypt if needed — it's useless without the key

---

Requirements

• macOS (uses the security CLI for Keychain access)
• Node.js ≥ 18

Cross-platform support (Linux/Windows via keytar) is planned for v0.2.

---

Workflow example

cd ~/projects/new-thing
git init

# Secrets already stored? Check:
claude-secrets search 'GITEA|DB'

# Add new ones:
op read "op://Private/Gitea/token" | claude-secrets set GITEA_TOKEN
claude-secrets set DB_PASSWORD              # type, Ctrl-D

# Commit-safe .env:
cat > .env <<EOF
GITEA_TOKEN=secret://GITEA_TOKEN
DATABASE_URL=postgres://app:secret://DB_PASSWORD@localhost:5432/mydb
PORT=3000
EOF

# Let Claude read specific tokens (optional):
mkdir -p .claude
cat > .claude/secrets.yml <<EOF
allow:
  - GITEA_TOKEN
  - DB_PASSWORD
EOF

# Dev server with secrets injected:
claude-secrets exec -- pnpm dev

---

Troubleshooting

"Keychain entry not found" Setup wasn't run. Run claude-secrets-setup.

"Invalid ciphertext format" secrets.encrypted is corrupt or was encrypted with a different key. Restore from backup or delete and start over.

Keychain prompt on every read Normal on the first session after login. Check "Always Allow". If it keeps prompting: Keychain Access app → find claude-secrets-mcp → right-click → Access Control → add the node binary.

claude-secrets: command not found

export PATH="$(npm bin -g):$PATH"

MCP not visible in Claude

claude mcp list | grep claude-secrets      # should show "✓ Connected"

If not: restart the Claude session.

Secret in .env but expansion fails Check: claude-secrets get NAME — exists? Name match is case-sensitive. Placeholder syntax must be exactly secret:// (not @secrets: or ${secrets:}).

---

Uninstall

claude mcp remove claude-secrets --scope user
security delete-generic-password -s claude-secrets-mcp -a master-key
rm ~/.claude/secrets.encrypted
npm uninstall -g @vaultry/claude-secrets
rm -f ~/.claude/commands/secret-set.md ~/.claude/commands/secret-get.md
# Remove the session-hook line from ~/.claude/settings.json manually

---

License

Source-available under the Vaultry Source-Available License v1.0. Free for personal, educational, and internal use. Commercial use (resale, SaaS, bundled products) requires a separate commercial license — contact mail@jorisslagter.nl.

See LICENSE.md for full terms.

---