Lilith Zero is a high-performance security runtime that mitigates data exfiltration and unauthorized tool invocation in LLM-based agent systems. It interposes at the transport layer, enforcing security invariants through deterministic policy evaluation and strictly framed execution.

OS, framework, and language agnostic: uniform security primitives across all implementation environments.

---

Technical Fundamentals

• Fail-Closed Architecture: defaults to DENY. Missing policy, parse error, or internal fault → all traffic blocked.
• Zero-Trust Transport: stdio and network payloads treated as potentially malicious; strict Content-Length framing prevents JSON smuggling.
• Type-Safe Invariants: Rust type system makes invalid security states (e.g. unverified taint propagation) unrepresentable at compile time.
• Deterministic Classification: tool classes are declared explicitly in policy; no runtime heuristics.

---

Core Capabilities

Capability	Implementation
Deterministic ACLs	Static allow/deny mapping for tool names and resource URIs.
Dynamic Taint Tracking	Session-bound sensitivity tags with explicit tool-class declarations.
Lethal Trifecta Protection	Auto-blocks the "Access Private → Access Untrusted → Exfiltrate" pattern.
Tamper-Proof Audit Logs	HMAC-SHA256 signed JSONL for non-repudiation.
Logic-Based Policies	Argument-level enforcement via recursive JsonLogic predicates.
Zero-Copy Runtime	<1 ms overhead via reference-based internal message passing.
Process Supervision	OS-level lifecycle management (PR_SET_PDEATHSIG / Job Objects / kqueue).
Transport Hardening	Content-Length framing; 10 MB body cap; 4 KB header cap.
Distributed Tracing	lilith-telemetry integration for cross-process span propagation and audit dashboards.

---

System Architecture

graph LR
    Agent["AI Agent / LLM"] -->|stdio| Codec

    subgraph lz["Lilith Zero (Rust)"]
        Codec["Hardened Codec"] --> Coord["Session Coordinator"]
        Coord --> Policy["Policy Engine"]
        Coord --> Taint["Taint Tracker"]
        Coord --> Audit["Audit Logger"]
        Coord --> Proc["Process Supervisor"]
    end

    Proc -->|stdio| ToolLocal["MCP Server (local)"]
    Coord -.->|Streamable HTTP| ToolRemote["MCP Server (remote)"]

The agent always communicates with Lilith Zero over stdio: the transport setting only changes how Lilith Zero connects upstream: spawning a local child process (stdio mode) or acting as an HTTP client to a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP mode). Policy enforcement, taint tracking, and audit logging apply in both cases.

Components

Component	Role
Hardened Codec	LSP Content-Length framing; drops oversized frames before parse
Session Coordinator	Tokio actor; owns session state, taint set, history, HMAC token
Policy Engine	Static ACL + ordered taint rules; JsonLogic argument predicates
Taint Tracker	Tainted<T> / Clean<T> phantom wrappers; only Policy Engine produces Clean<T>
Process Supervisor	Platform-native child binding prevents orphan MCP server processes
Audit Logger	HMAC-signed JSONL to stderr + optional file; every decision logged

---

Agent Integrations

All adapters share the same policy engine, taint tracker, and audit layer: only the I/O contract differs.

Claude Code

Hooks fire on every tool call. Lilith reads the JSON event from stdin and signals via exit code: 0 = allow, 2 = block.

.claude/settings.json (project) or ~/.claude/settings.json:

{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse":  [{"matcher": "", "hooks": [{"type": "command", "command": "lilith-zero hook --policy /path/to/policy.yaml"}]}],
    "PostToolUse": [{"matcher": "", "hooks": [{"type": "command", "command": "lilith-zero hook --policy /path/to/policy.yaml"}]}]
  }
}

See scripts/hooks.json for a ready-to-use template.

GitHub Copilot CLI

Copilot reads {"permissionDecision":"allow"|"deny"} from stdout; exit code is always 0.

~/.config/github-copilot/hooks.json:

{
  "preToolUse":  {"command": "lilith-zero hook --format copilot --event preToolUse --policy /path/to/policy.yaml"},
  "postToolUse": {"command": "lilith-zero hook --format copilot --event postToolUse --policy /path/to/policy.yaml"}
}

See examples/gh-copilot/ for complete policy examples (bash, view, rg, glob, report_intent).

VS Code Copilot Sidebar

Event type is inferred from the payload: no --event flag required.

.vscode/settings.json:

{
  "github.copilot.chat.agent.hooks": {
    "PreToolUse":  {"command": "lilith-zero hook --format vscode --policy /path/to/policy.yaml"},
    "PostToolUse": {"command": "lilith-zero hook --format vscode --policy /path/to/policy.yaml"}
  }
}

See examples/vscode/ (editFiles, runTerminalCommand, #fetch, #codebase, MCP tools).

OpenClaw

OpenClaw uses stdio MCP only. Wrap each MCP server via lilith-zero run in ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json:

{
  "mcp": {
    "servers": {
      "filesystem": {
        "command": "lilith-zero",
        "args": ["run",
                 "--upstream-cmd", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /home/user/projects",
                 "--policy", "~/.lilith/openclaw-policy.yaml"],
        "transport": "stdio",
        "env": {"LILITH_ZERO_PIN_FILE": "~/.lilith/pins/filesystem.json"}
      }
    }
  }
}

See examples/openclaw/ for policy-base.yaml (conservative) and policy-paranoid.yaml (read-only).
The examples/openclaw/CVE-COVERAGE.md maps all 139 OpenClaw advisories to the corresponding lilith-zero controls.

Forward-looking: once OpenClaw ships its hook system (#60943), replace the run wrapper with:
lilith-zero hook --format openclaw --policy ~/.lilith/openclaw-policy.yaml

Copilot Studio Webhook

REST server implementing the Microsoft Copilot Studio External Threat Detection API.

# Dev: no auth
lilith-zero serve --bind 127.0.0.1:8080 --auth-mode none --policy policy.yaml

# Production: Microsoft Entra ID (RS256)
lilith-zero serve --bind 0.0.0.0:8443 \
  --auth-mode entra \
  --entra-tenant-id <TENANT_GUID> \
  --entra-audience https://security.contoso.com \
  --policy policy.yaml

Endpoints: POST /validate (health), POST /analyze-tool-execution (policy evaluation).

Session Persistence

Hook mode maintains taint state across binary restarts within a session. State is stored in ~/.lilith/sessions/<session-id>.json under a cross-process file lock (LockFileEx on Windows, flock on Unix). Taints accumulated in one tool call are visible to the next invocation.

---

Transports

stdio (default)

lilith-zero run --upstream-cmd "python mcp_server.py" --policy policy.yaml

Wraps a child MCP server process. Lilith Zero sits between agent and server on stdin/stdout.

Streamable HTTP (MCP 2025-11-25)

lilith-zero run --transport http --upstream-url http://localhost:9000/mcp --policy policy.yaml

Connects to a remote MCP server; no child process spawned.

---

SDKs

Python

uv add lilith-zero          # auto-downloads the correct binary for your platform
# or: pip install lilith-zero

from lilith_zero import Lilith

async with Lilith("python mcp_server.py", policy="policy.yaml") as lz:
    result = await lz.call_tool("read_file", {"path": "/data/report.txt"})

TypeScript / Node.js

bun add @badcompany/lilith-zero
# or: npm install @badcompany/lilith-zero

import { Lilith } from "@badcompany/lilith-zero";

await using lz = new Lilith({ upstream: "bun mcp_server.ts", policy: "policy.yaml" });
const result = await lz.callTool("read_file", { path: "/data/report.txt" });

---

Setup

1. Install

Python SDK (manages the binary automatically):

uv add lilith-zero
# or: pip install lilith-zero

Shell (Unix/macOS):

curl -sSfL https://badcompany.xyz/lilith-zero/install.sh | sh

PowerShell (Windows):

irm https://badcompany.xyz/lilith-zero/install.ps1 | iex

2. Write a policy

id: my-policy
customer_id: my-org
name: "My Agent Policy"
version: 1

protect_lethal_trifecta: true   # auto-blocks ACCESS_PRIVATE + UNTRUSTED_SOURCE → EXFILTRATION

# Declare tool classes explicitly: Lilith performs no heuristic inference.
tool_classes:
  curl:         [EXFILTRATION]
  send_email:   [EXFILTRATION]

static_rules:
  read_file:   ALLOW
  calculator:  ALLOW
  bash:        DENY

taint_rules:
  - tool: read_file
    action: ADD_TAINT
    tag: ACCESS_PRIVATE

  - tool: curl
    action: ADD_TAINT
    tag: UNTRUSTED_SOURCE

resource_rules: []

protect_lethal_trifecta: true injects a rule that blocks any tool declared as EXFILTRATION class when both ACCESS_PRIVATE and UNTRUSTED_SOURCE taints are simultaneously active. Tool class assignments are always explicit in the policy: no name-based inference.

3. Wire it to your agent

# Claude Code: one-liner setup
echo '{"hooks":{"PreToolUse":[{"matcher":"","hooks":[{"type":"command","command":"lilith-zero hook --policy $(pwd)/policy.yaml"}]}]}}' \
  > .claude/settings.json

4. Environment variables

Variable	Description	Default
LILITH_ZERO_FORCE_LETHAL_TRIFECTA	Global override: enforces trifecta protection regardless of policy.	false
LILITH_ZERO_SECURITY_LEVEL	audit_only or block_params.	block_params
LILITH_ZERO_JWT_SECRET	HMAC secret for external audience token verification.	:
LOG_LEVEL	debug / info / warn / error.	info

---

Observability

Audit Logs

Every decision: ALLOW and DENY: emits a tamper-evident JSONL line to stderr:

[AUDIT] <HMAC-SHA256-base64url> {"session_id":"…","timestamp":…,"event_type":"Decision","details":{"decision":"DENY","tool_name":"curl"}}

Verifying the signature against the session key proves the log was not altered after the fact.

lilith-telemetry

lilith-telemetry is a companion sidecar that aggregates Lilith Zero security events into structured, distributed traces. It implements the TelemetryHook trait and routes spans through a configurable Flock dispatch pipeline.

# Run with telemetry enabled (Flock link from your dashboard)
lilith-zero-telemetry run \
  --upstream-cmd "python mcp_server.py" \
  --policy policy.yaml \
  --flock-link "lilith://collector:7700?key_id=0x<hex>"

Each tool call produces a parent span with child spans for codec framing, policy evaluation, and the upstream call. Decisions are tagged LEVEL: ROUTINE (allow) or LEVEL: CRITICAL (deny/violation):

SESSION: 189e9a3a…  TRACE: 189e9a44…  SPAN: 189e9a44…  LEVEL: CRITICAL  KIND: Server
MSG: Blocked tool web_search: Web search prohibited after database access (exfiltration prevention)

Multi-tool interactions from a single LLM reasoning step are grouped into unified trace spans, enabling precise audit of the full agent decision chain.

---

Security & Assurance

Layer	Implementation	Status
Formal Verification	Kani Rust Verifier proofs: taint sanitization, overflow safety, session entropy	Verified
Fuzz Testing	Cargo Fuzz: JSON-RPC codec and policy parser	Active
Static Analysis	Clippy -D warnings + Cargo Audit supply chain	Passing
Red Teaming	Python SDK hermetic test suite: prompt injection, payload malformation, policy bypass	Passing
Type Safety	Rust (memory safety) + mypy --strict (Python SDK)	Enforced

View full SECURITY.md for proof harnesses and audit logs.

---

Performance

Micro-benchmarks (core logic):

• Codec decoding: ~247 ns / message
• Policy evaluation: ~660 ns / rule

End-to-end (Windows, release build, p50):

• RPC overhead: < 0.5 ms
• Startup: ~15 ms (process spawn + handshake)
• Memory: ~4 MB RSS
• Throughput: > 1.5 M validations/sec

---

Development

See docs/development.md for full setup.

# Rust core (from lilith-zero/)
cargo build && cargo test --all-features
cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings

# Python SDK (from sdk/)
uv venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev]" && uv run pytest tests -v

---

License

Apache License, Version 2.0. See LICENSE.