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VaultPilot MCP

Safety first. Hardware-verified DeFi for AI agents — designed for when the AI can be compromised.

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About VaultPilot MCP

VaultPilot MCP is an MCP server in the Blockchain category: safety first. Hardware-verified DeFi for AI agents — designed for when the AI can be compromised.

The repository has 4 stars and 0 forks.

Install

Claude Code
claude mcp add vaultpilot-mcp -- npx -y vaultpilot-mcp
npx
npx -y vaultpilot-mcp

This server has no ConduID identity, so agent calls to it are not receipted. Pin the version you install and review the source before granting it credentials.

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README

VaultPilot MCP

npm version license node vaultpilot-mcp MCP server

Self-custodial crypto portfolio and DeFi, managed by AI agents — signed on your Ledger hardware wallet.

VaultPilot MCP demo

VaultPilot MCP is a Model Context Protocol server that lets AI agents — Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible client — read your on-chain positions across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Polygon, Base, and TRON and prepare EVM transactions that you sign on your Ledger device via WalletConnect. Your private keys never leave the hardware wallet, and every transaction is previewed in human-readable form before you approve it on the device.

Supported protocols: Aave V3, Compound V3 (Comet), Morpho Blue, Uniswap V3 LP, Lido (stETH/wstETH), EigenLayer, plus LiFi for swap/bridge aggregation and 1inch for optional intra-chain quote comparison.

Use it when you want to:

  • Ask an agent "what are my DeFi positions across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Polygon, and Base?" and get a unified portfolio view (wallet balances + Aave/Compound/Morpho lending + Uniswap V3 LP + Lido/EigenLayer staking) with USD totals.
  • Get liquidation-risk alerts ("any position below health factor 1.5?") without manually checking dashboards.
  • Swap or bridge tokens — the agent prepares the route via LiFi, you sign on Ledger.
  • Supply, borrow, repay, withdraw on lending protocols; stake ETH on Lido; deposit into EigenLayer strategies; send ETH or ERC-20 tokens — all through Ledger-signed transactions.
  • Assess protocol security before interacting with it: contract verification, EIP-1967 proxy/admin keys, privileged roles (Ownable, AccessControl, Gnosis Safe multisig, Timelock), and a DefiLlama-backed 0–100 risk score.
  • Look up token prices, resolve ENS names, and poll transaction status.

This is an agent-driven portfolio management tool, not a wallet replacement. The MCP never holds keys or broadcasts anything you haven't approved on your Ledger device.

Features

  • Positions — lending/borrowing (Aave, Compound, Morpho), LP positions, and health-factor alerts
  • Portfolio — cross-chain balances, DeFi position aggregation, USD-denominated summaries
  • Staking — Lido, EigenLayer, reward aggregation, yield estimation
  • Security — contract verification, upgradeability checks, privileged-role enumeration, protocol risk scoring
  • Swaps — LiFi-routed intra-chain and cross-chain quotes; intra-chain routes are also cross-checked against 1inch (when an API key is configured) with a bestSource hint and output-delta savings
  • Execution — tx preparation for Aave, Compound, Morpho, Lido, EigenLayer, native/token sends, swaps; signing via Ledger Live (WalletConnect) for EVM chains
  • Utilities — ENS forward/reverse resolution, token balances, transaction status

Security model

VaultPilot assumes the AI agent can be compromised, the MCP server can be compromised, and your host computer can be compromised. Only your Ledger device is trusted. Every transaction is cryptographically bound across every layer so that tampering anywhere — a swapped recipient, a rewritten swap route, a smuggled approval — produces a visible mismatch on the device screen, giving you the chance to reject before anything is signed.

Private keys never leave the Ledger device. Every state-changing transaction is prepared read-only by the server, previewed in human-readable form, and approved on the device's own screen — the only display in the pipeline that isn't filtered through the agent.

user-intent ──► agent ──► MCP server ──► WalletConnect / USB-HID ──► Ledger Live / host ──► Ledger device

VaultPilot layers defenses so most single-layer compromises are caught by at least one cross-check, and the cases that aren't are called out honestly. The layers include a server-side prepare↔send fingerprint, an independent 4byte.directory selector cross-check, an agent-side ABI decode and pair-consistency pre-sign hash recomputation that auto-run at preview_send and are reported in a CHECKS PERFORMED block (with a swiss-knife decoder URL as a suggested fallback when the agent's ABI decode is low-confidence), an on-device final check — in blind-sign mode the user matches a Ledger-displayed hash against the one the server returned; in clear-sign mode (Aave, Lido, 1inch, LiFi, approve plugins) the user checks decoded fields (function name, amount, recipient, spender) against the compact summary shown in chat — a verbatim PREPARE RECEIPT of the args the agent actually passed, a previewToken + userDecision gate against accidental preview-step collapse, a WalletConnect session-topic cross-check (the agent surfaces the last 8 chars of the WC session topic and asks the user to confirm a matching session exists in Ledger Live → Settings → Connected Apps, catching peer impersonation any self-reported name/URL can't), and — for skeptical users on high-value flows — a get_verification_artifact that routes bytes to a second, independent LLM for cross-verification.

See SECURITY.md for the full defenses table, threat → catches-it mapping, honest limits, the payloadFingerprint verification recipe, and the second-agent verification flow.

Supported chains

EVM: Ethereum, Arbitrum, Polygon, Base.

Non-EVM: TRON — full reads (balance, staking state, SR listing) and full write coverage (native TRX sends, canonical TRC-20 transfers, voting-reward claims, Stake 2.0 freeze/unfreeze/withdraw-expire-unfreeze, and VoteWitness) signed on a directly-connected Ledger over USB HID. Ledger Live's WalletConnect relay does not currently honor the tron: namespace (verified 2026-04-14), so TRON signing goes through @ledgerhq/hw-app-trx — the user's Ledger must be plugged into the host running the MCP, unlocked, with the TRON app open. Pair via pair_ledger_tron once per session.

Not every protocol is on every chain. Lido and EigenLayer are L1-only (Ethereum). Morpho Blue is currently enabled on Ethereum only — it is deployed on Base at the same address but the discovery scan needs a pinned deployment block, tracked as a follow-up. TRON has no lending/LP coverage in this server (none of Aave/Compound/Morpho/Uniswap are deployed there); balance reads return TRX + canonical TRC-20 stablecoins (USDT, USDC, USDD, TUSD) that together cover the vast majority of TRON token volume, and TRON-native staking (frozen TRX under Stake 2.0, pending unfreezes, claimable voting rewards) is surfaced via get_tron_staking and folded into the portfolio summary. Readers short-circuit cleanly on chains where a protocol isn't deployed.

Roadmap

  • MetaMask support (WalletConnect) — alongside the existing Ledger Live integration. Will let users sign through a MetaMask-paired session when a hardware wallet isn't available.
  • Solana — coming later. Non-EVM: introduces a separate SDK (@solana/web3.js), base58 addresses, and the WalletConnect solana: namespace for signing.
  • Server-integrated second-agent verification — have the MCP call an independent second-provider LLM directly on every high-value or blind-sign-expected send_transaction, relay its verdict to the user, and block the send on disagreement. Structurally closes the coordinated-agent gap that today's copy-paste get_verification_artifact flow only narrows (the copy-paste path depends on the first agent not silently suppressing the artifact). Additive, opt-in feature — the self-custody trust model (no private keys on the server, no broadcast without device approval) is unchanged.

Tools exposed to the agent

Read-only (no Ledger pairing required):

  • get_portfolio_summary — cross-chain portfolio aggregation with USD totals; pass an optional tronAddress (base58, prefix T) alongside an EVM wallet to fold TRX + TRC-20 balances + TRON staking (frozen + pending-unfreeze + claimable rewards) into the same total (returned under breakdown.tron, tronUsd, and tronStakingUsd)
  • get_lending_positions — Aave V3 collateral/debt/health-factor per wallet
  • get_compound_positions — Compound V3 (Comet) base + collateral positions
  • get_morpho_positions — Morpho Blue positions; auto-discovers the wallet's markets via event-log scan when marketIds is omitted (pass explicit ids for a fast path)
  • get_lp_positions — Uniswap V3 LP positions, fee tier, in-range, IL estimate
  • get_staking_positions, get_staking_rewards, estimate_staking_yield — Lido + EigenLayer
  • get_health_alerts — Aave positions near liquidation
  • simulate_position_change — projected Aave health factor for a hypothetical action
  • simulate_transaction — run eth_call against a prepared or arbitrary tx to preview success/revert before signing; prepared txs are re-simulated automatically at send time
  • get_token_balance, get_token_price — balances and DefiLlama prices; get_token_balance accepts chain: "tron" with a base58 wallet and a base58 TRC-20 address (or token: "native" for TRX), returning a TronBalance shape
  • get_tron_staking — TRON-native staking state for a base58 address: claimable voting rewards (WithdrawBalance-ready), frozen TRX under Stake 2.0 (bandwidth + energy), and pending unfreezes with ISO unlock timestamps. Pair with prepare_tron_claim_rewards to actually withdraw accumulated rewards.
  • list_tron_witnesses — TRON Super Representatives + SR candidates, ranked by vote weight, with a rough voter-APR estimate per SR. Optionally augments with the caller's current vote allocation, total TRON Power, and available (unused) votes — pair with prepare_tron_vote.
  • resolve_ens_name, reverse_resolve_ens — ENS forward/reverse
  • get_swap_quote — LiFi quote (optionally cross-checked against 1inch)
  • check_contract_security, check_permission_risks, get_protocol_risk_score — risk tooling
  • get_transaction_status — poll inclusion by hash
  • get_verification_artifact — returns a sparse, copy-paste-friendly JSON artifact (raw calldata + chain + payloadHash + preSignHash if pinned) for a prepared tx, plus a canned prompt telling a second LLM how to independently decode it. Intended for adversarial cross-verification on high-value flows — see SECURITY.md

Meta:

  • request_capability — agent-facing escape hatch: files a GitHub issue on this repo when the user asks for something vaultpilot-mcp can't do (new protocol, new chain, missing tool). Default mode returns a pre-filled issue URL (zero spam risk — user must click to submit). Operators can set VAULTPILOT_FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT to a proxy that posts directly. Rate-limited: 30s between calls, 3/hour, 10/day, 7-day dedupe on identical summaries.

Execution (Ledger-signed):

  • pair_ledger_live (WalletConnect, EVM), pair_ledger_tron (USB HID, TRON), get_ledger_status — session management and account discovery; get_ledger_status returns per-chain EVM exposure (accountDetails[] with address, chainIds, chains) so duplicate-looking addresses across chains are disambiguated, the WalletConnect session topic (the agent is instructed to surface its last 8 chars and ask the user to verify a matching session in Ledger Live → Settings → Connected Apps before the first send_transaction — any WC peer can self-report "Ledger Wallet" / wc.apps.ledger.com, but the session topic is unique per pairing), and a tron: [{ address, path, appVersion, accountIndex }, …] array (one entry per paired TRON account) when pair_ledger_tron has been called. Pass accountIndex: 1 (2, 3, …) to pair additional TRON accounts.
  • prepare_aave_supply / _withdraw / _borrow / _repay
  • prepare_compound_supply / _withdraw / _borrow / _repay
  • prepare_morpho_supply / _withdraw / _borrow / _repay / _supply_collateral / _withdraw_collateral
  • prepare_lido_stake, prepare_lido_unstake
  • prepare_eigenlayer_deposit
  • prepare_swap — LiFi-routed intra- or cross-chain swap/bridge
  • prepare_native_send, prepare_token_send
  • prepare_tron_native_send, prepare_tron_token_send, prepare_tron_claim_rewards, prepare_tron_freeze, prepare_tron_unfreeze, prepare_tron_withdraw_expire_unfreeze, prepare_tron_vote — TRON tx builders (native TRX send, canonical TRC-20 transfer, WithdrawBalance claim, Stake 2.0 freeze/unfreeze/withdraw-expire-unfreeze, VoteWitness)
  • send_transaction — forwards a prepared tx for user approval. EVM handles go to Ledger Live via WalletConnect; TRON handles go to the USB-connected Ledger via @ledgerhq/hw-app-trx and are broadcast via TronGrid

Requirements

  • Node.js >= 18.17
  • An RPC provider (Infura, Alchemy, or custom) for the EVM chains
  • Optional: Etherscan API key, 1inch Developer Portal API key (enables swap-quote comparison), WalletConnect Cloud project ID (required for EVM Ledger signing), TronGrid API key (enables TRX + TRC-20 balance reads)
  • For TRON signing: USB HID access to a Ledger device with the Tron app installed. On Linux, Ledger's udev rules must be installed or hidraw access fails with "permission denied". The @ledgerhq/hw-transport-node-hid dependency compiles node-hid natively at npm install time, which needs libudev-dev + a C/C++ toolchain on Debian/Ubuntu (sudo apt install libudev-dev build-essential).

Install

From npm (recommended)

npm install -g vaultpilot-mcp
vaultpilot-mcp-setup

From source

git clone https://github.com/szhygulin/vaultpilot-mcp.git
cd vaultpilot-mcp
npm install
npm run build

Setup

Run the interactive setup to pick an RPC provider, validate the key, optionally pair Ledger Live, and write ~/.vaultpilot-mcp/config.json:

npm run setup

Environment variables always override the config file at runtime.

Use with Claude Desktop

Add to claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vaultpilot-mcp": {
      "command": "vaultpilot-mcp"
    }
  }
}

(If you installed from source rather than via npm i -g, swap "command": "vaultpilot-mcp" for "command": "node" and "args": ["/absolute/path/to/vaultpilot-mcp/dist/index.js"].)

The setup script prints a ready-to-paste snippet.

Environment variables

All are optional if the matching field is in ~/.vaultpilot-mcp/config.json; env vars take precedence when both are set.

  • ETHEREUM_RPC_URL, ARBITRUM_RPC_URL, POLYGON_RPC_URL, BASE_RPC_URL — custom RPC endpoints
  • RPC_PROVIDER (infura | alchemy) + RPC_API_KEY — alternative to custom URLs
  • ETHERSCAN_API_KEY — contract verification lookups
  • ONEINCH_API_KEY — enables 1inch quote comparison in get_swap_quote
  • TRON_API_KEY — TronGrid API key (sent as TRON-PRO-API-KEY). Required in practice to read TRON balances — anonymous TronGrid calls are capped at ~15 req/min, which the portfolio fan-out exceeds. Free to create at trongrid.io.
  • WALLETCONNECT_PROJECT_ID — required for Ledger Live signing
  • RPC_BATCH=1 — opt into JSON-RPC batching (off by default; many public endpoints mishandle batched POSTs)
  • VAULTPILOT_ALLOW_INSECURE_RPC=1 — opt out of the https/private-IP check on RPC URLs. Only set this when pointing at a local anvil/hardhat fork; never in production. (Old name RECON_ALLOW_INSECURE_RPC is still honored for one release.)
  • VAULTPILOT_FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT — optional https URL for request_capability to POST directly (e.g. a maintainer-operated proxy that creates GitHub issues with a bot token). When unset (the default), request_capability returns a pre-filled GitHub issue URL for the user to click through; nothing is transmitted automatically. Operator responsibility: the vaultpilot-mcp client does not sign or authenticate POST requests. If you set this endpoint, the proxy MUST enforce its own auth (IP allowlist, Cloudflare Access, HMAC header validation, etc.) — otherwise any caller who learns the URL can submit to it. The on-process rate limiter (3/hour, 10/day) is a courtesy, not a security control. (Old name RECON_FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT is still honored for one release.)

Development

npm run dev      # tsc --watch
npm test         # vitest run
npm run test:watch

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

README copy captured when this server was indexed; it may lag the repository. The original is authoritative.

Questions

About VaultPilot MCP

How do I install VaultPilot MCP?

Run claude mcp add vaultpilot-mcp -- npx -y vaultpilot-mcp, then add the server to your MCP client's configuration.

Is VaultPilot MCP safe to use with an AI agent?

Its trust score is 37 out of 100 (low). It passes 1 of the 1 static security checks run so far. It has no ConduID identity yet, so agent calls to it are not receipted.

Is VaultPilot MCP still maintained?

Conduid hasn't recorded a commit date for this repository yet. Check the repository directly for recent activity.